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TORT

LAW-UNIFORM

CONTRIBUTION

ACT-COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

AMONG

TORTFEASORS

AcT-The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has held that the Comparative Negligence Act has modified
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to require a
non-settling tortfeasor to pay his full pro rata share of damages,
notwithstanding the fact that the consideration paid by the settling tortfeasor for a release from the plaintiff exceeds the settling
tortfeasor's jury determined pro rata share of damages.
Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1 (1987).
On January 17, 1977, George Charles was about to enter the
front door entrance of a Giant Eagle supermarket in the City of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.1 The floor mat that activated the automatic door was covered with snow and slush.2 When Charles
stepped on the floor mat, the doors failed to open.' Charles then
attempted to push the doors open, slipped on the snow and slush
covered floor mat, and fell to the ground as the doors suddenly
swung open.' As a result of the fall, Charles sustained injuries to
his right arm and left leg.3
Charles subsequently filed an action in trespass against 'Giant
Eagle, alleging in his complaint that the supermarket's failure to
keep the automatic doors in working order, and the floor mat clear
from snow and ice, were the sole and proximate cause of his injuries.' Giant Eagle joined, as additional defendants, Stanley Magic
Door, Inc., and Jed Doors,7 stating that the manufacturer was liable for Charles' injuries by designing and selling defective doors.8
Before the case went to trial, Giant Eagle entered into a release
with Charles, 9 pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among
1. Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1, 5 (1987).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 330 Pa. Super. 76, 478 A.2d 1359, 1360, n.2 (1984).
Both parties stipulated that Stanley Magic Door, Inc. and Jed Doors were the same corporation (here-in referred to as Stanley). Id.
8. Id.
9. Id., n.3. The release read in pertinent part:
It is further Understood and Agreed that I . . . am not releasing any claims and
demands that I have against any person, association or corporation other than GIANT EAGLE MARKETS, INC., his agents and employees on account of the . ..
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Tortfeasors Act (UCATA),' 0 for $22,500.00." The jury verdict at
trial, guided by the court's instructions consistent with the provisions of the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA),' 2 set Charles'
damages at $31,000.00. Liability was apportioned between the
tortfeasors at sixty percent for Giant Eagle and forty percent for
Stanley.' 3
Upon denial of its post-trial motion to mold the verdict, Stanley
entered judgment on the verdict and paid Charles $8,500.00.1" This
amount was $3,900.00 less than Stanley's pro rata share of the
damages.'6 Stanley petitioned the court to have the judgment
against it marked as satisfied, reasoning that the $31,000.00 verdict
was satisfied by Giant Eagle's payment of the $22,500.00 settlement figure and the $8,500.00 paid by Stanley."' The trial court
granted the petition and directed the prothonotary to mark the
injuries and damages sustained by me .... but for the consideration paid me herein,
I further agree that any recovery that I may obtain against any person, association, or
corporation other than GIANT EAGLE MARKETS, INC. on account of said . . .
injuries and damages shall be reduced to the extent of the pro rata share of such
damages as may be attributable to GIANT EAGLE MARKETS, INC. . . . of my
damages recoverable against all the tortfeasors.
Id.
10. Charles, 513 Pa. at 482, 522 A.2d at 5. The Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1978), states in pertinent part:
A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides, but
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration
paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides
that the total claim shall be reduced if greater than the consideration paid.
Id.
11. 513 Pa. at 482, 522 A.2d at 5.
12. Id. at 476, 522 A.2d at 2. The Comparative Negligence Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1978), states in pertinent part:
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution - Where recovery is allowed
against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion
of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his
causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants
against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the
allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from
recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share
may seek contribution.
Id.
13. 513 Pa. at 483, 522 A.2d at 5. This allocation of liability set Giant Eagle's pro rata
share at $18,600.00 and Stanley's pro rata share at $12,400.00. Thus, due to the release,
Giant Eagle paid out $3,900.00 more than its jury determined pro rata share. Id.
14. Id. The $8,500.00 that Stanley paid Charles was the difference between the jury
verdict of $31,000.00 and the $22,500.00 settlement received from Giant Eagle. Id.
15. Id. at 484, 522 A.2d at 6.
16. Id.
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judgment against Stanley satisfied, notwithstanding the fact that
Stanley's pro rata share of liability was forty percent of the
$31,000.00 in damages as determined by the jury."7
Charles, arguing that under the CNA and the UCATA he was
still entitled to forty percent of the $31,000.00 verdict from Stanley, regardless of Giant Eagle's settlement of over sixty percent of
the verdict, appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 18 Relying on the prior decisions of Daugherty v. Hershbergere and Mong
2 ° the superior court affirmed the trial court's
v. Hershberger,
decision.21
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to decide
"whether, under the Comparative Negligence Act and the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA"), a non-settling
tortfeasor is relieved of responsibility for payment of his proportionate share of the damages to the extent that the consideration
paid by a settling tortfeasor exceeds the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of damages as determined by the jury. 2 2 The
court, in holding that the non-settling tortfeasor is liable for the
full amount of his pro rata share of the jury verdict, reversed the
lower courts, overruled Daugherty and rejected Mong.2"
Chief Justice Nix, writing for the majority, premised his opinion,
17. Id.
18. Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 330 Pa. Super. 76, 478 A.2d 1359 (1984). On appeal, Charles argued that the CNA had modified the UCATA so as to require a non-settling
tortfeasor to pay to a plaintiff the total percentage share of its liability, notwithstanding a
previous settlement between the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor. Id.
19. 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), overruled, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1 (1987). In the
Daugherty case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed section 4 of the UCATA of
1951 as requiring a reduction in a plaintiff's claim against all tortfeasors by the amount of
the settlement figure paid by a settling tortfeasor. Id.
20. 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962), allocatur denied, (1963). In Mong, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court allowed a settling tortfeasor who paid more than his pro rata
share to seek contribution from the non-settling tortfeasor. Id.
21. 330 Pa. Super. at 82. A main contention of Charles on appeal was that under the
trial court's decision, Stanley would be unjustly enriched by escaping liability for $3,900.00
of the verdict. Charles argued that if a windfall benefit must flow, it should naturally flow to
the one wronged, not the wrongdoer. Judge Brosky of the superior court, in disagreeing with
Charles' reasoning, did not believe that a windfall benefit would flow to either party under
the court's interpretation of Daugherty and Mong. Under the Daugherty rule, Charles could
collect $8,500.00 from Stanley; under Mong, Giant Eagle could collect $3,900.00 from Stanley by way of contribution. Thus, Stanley would indirectly end up paying its pro rata share
of the verdict, while Charles would receive only what he was entitled to, the $31,000.00
verdict, and no more. Id.
22. Charles, 513 Pa. at 476, 522 A.2d at 2.
23. Id. at 483, 522 A.2d at 5.
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in part, on the policy of encouraging settlements.2 4 The Chief Justice stated that "[iut would be an equal disservice to a supportive
settlement policy to provide a windfall to a non-settling tortfeasor
where the settlement proves to be more generous than the subsequent verdict."2 5 In making this statement, the Chief Justice was
reiterating Justice Musmanno's dissent in Daugherty.2 6
According to the court, the position advocated by Stanley would
seriously erode the policy of encouraging settlements, as well as
suggest that the jury verdict is the maximum amount recoverable.2 7 The court was of the opinion that, in light of settlements,
the jury verdict should not be a ceiling on the total amount of
compensation afforded to a plaintiff since "[p]laintiffs bear the risk
of poor settlements; logic and equity dictate that the benefit of
good settlements should also be theirs. "28
The court went on to interpret section 7102(b) of the Comparative
Negligence Act" as requiring a defendant to pay a proportion of
the jury verdict in relation to the percentage of causal negligence
attributed to him.30 Under this interpretation, Stanley would be
obligated to pay forty percent of the jury verdict, or $12,400.00.31
Under the court's interpretation of UCATA section 8326,32 the
parties negotiating the release could determine the amount or proportion of the total claim reduced by the release." The court then
went on to find that the parties to the release in the case at bar
had stipulated in the release that the total claim would be reduced
by Giant Eagle's pro rata share, as later determined by the jury to
be $18,600.00, or sixty percent of the verdict.3 4 Under the above
24. Id. at 477, 522 A.2d at 2.
25. Id. at 478, 522 A.2d at 3.
26. Id. Justice Musmanno's dissent in Daugherty stated:
To me it is absurd that a tortfeasor, because of the generosity of another person with
whom he is in no way associated except in fault, should by law be excused from paying what a tribunal of law has determined he should pay as a result of his own adjudicated wrong.
Daugherty, 386 Pa. at 377, 126 A.2d at 735.
27. 513 Pa. at 478, 522 A.2d at 3.
28. Id. Chief Justice Nix, quoting from the Supreme Court of Texas' opinion in
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 430 (Tex. 1984).
29. Id. at 480, 522 A.2d at 4. See supra note 12 for the text of the Comparative Negligence Act.
30. 513 Pa. at 481, 522 A.2d at 4.
31. Id.
32. Id. See supra note 10 for the text of the pertinent provisions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
33. 513 Pa. at 482, 522 A.2d at 4.
34. Id. at 482, 522 A.2d at 5. See supra note 8 for terms of the release.
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interpretation of the pertinent statutes, the court overruled
Daugherty.3
In rejecting the Mong rule, which permitted a settling tortfeasor
who had paid more than his pro rata share to seek contribution
from a non-settling tortfeasor, the court reasoned that, in the case
at hand, the settling tortfeasor (Giant Eagle) freely elected to extinguish its liability through the release. Therefore, the settling
tortfeasor should not be permitted the benefit of contribution because of a bad bargain. 6 Chief Justice Nix was of the opinion that
the above result was fair and equitable to all the tortfeasors, explaining that:
Defendants have been required under the proportional reduction rule to pay
only their own share of liability, and they have not contributed anything to
the settlement excess. Since they are protected by the proportional reduction rule from the burden of a low settlement, they cannot claim that they
are entitled to the off-setting benefits of the rule . . .3

Justice Papadakos' concurrence attempted to explain the relationship between the Comparative Negligence Act, the contributory negligence law that it replaced, and the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act.3 s Justice Papadakos began with an historical analysis of tort law before the statutes were enacted, and went
on to discuss the three common law concepts of tort law that led to
the adoption of the statutes in question." The harshness of the
early common law concepts led to exceptions which permitted recovery in light of contributory negligence, 0 as well as contribution
among tortfeasors 1 under certain circumstances. The exceptions
to the no contribution rule were eventually codified and enacted as
35. 513 Pa. at 482, n.4, 522 A.2d at 5, n.4.
36. Id. at 481, 522 A.2d at 4.
37. Id. Chief Justice Nix quoting from Comment, ComparativeNegligence, Multiple
Parties,and Settlements, 65 CALF. L. REV. 1264, 1279 (1977).
38. 513 Pa. at 485, 522 A.2d at 5.
39. Id. at 486-87, 522 A.2d at 7. The three concepts discussed are: 1) joint and several
liability; 2) contributory negligence; and 3) no right of contribution between joint
tortfeasors. Id.
40. Id. Contributory negligence would not be a bar to recovery where a defendant's
conduct was 'willful', 'wanton' or 'reckless', where a defendant violated a rule of criminal
safety, where the plaintiff had no way of knowing the danger or means to avoid it, where the
plaintiff's negligence occurred during an emergency, or where the plaintiff's negligence was
not the proximate cause of the injury. Id.
41. Id. The courts began to allow contribution as a matter of equity, and also due to
the fact that apportioning damages among tortfeasors was still foreign to the law. Id.
42. Id.
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the UCATA.'4 Justice Papadakos then traced the enactment of the
UCATA as leading to the decisions in Daugherty and Mong."
Justice Papadakos explained that Daugherty, at the time, was a
proper application of the law of contribution among tortfeasors because the law had no method of apportioning damages; therefore, a
settlement by one tortfeasor was interpreted as discharging part of
the total liability of all tortfeasors, and not as discharging the settling tortfeasor's liability.' 5 Mong, according to Justice Papadakos,
carried Daugherty one step further by allowing settling tortfeasors
to obtain contribution from non-settling tortfeasors when the settling tortfeasor paid in excess of his share of the verdict.'6 Thus,
prior to comparative negligence, and in light of the court's inability
to apportion damages and liability, Daugherty and Mong were
viewed as the most equitable solutions available. 7
According to Justice Papadakos, the Comparative Negligence
Act was the legislative response to the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence. It was also an acknowledgement that damages and
liability are capable of being apportioned among a plaintiff and defendant tortfeasor. 48 Justice Papadakos saw the statute as a departure from the concept of joint and several liability. 4 He went on to

reason that since a tortfeasor's liability is equal only to his percentage of causal negligence under the Comparative Negligence
Act, any settlement discharges only the settling tortfeasor's respective percentage share of fault as determined by a court of law.50
The jury verdict will be reduced by the settling tortfeasor's percentage of fault, and not by the amount of consideration paid for
the release. 5 '
Lastly, Justice Papadakos distinguished the fact that contribution does not exist under the Comparative Negligence Act when a
defendant voluntarily settles with a plaintiff. Justice Papadakos
was of the opinion that the right of contribution under comparative negligence arises only when a defendant is compelled to pay
more than his share of the jury award, as distinguished from a vol43.
44.
45.
plaintiff
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 488, 522 A.2d at 8.
Id. The Daugherty court's interpretation of section 4 of the UCATA would bar the
from securing a double recovery under the concept of joint and several liability. Id.
Id. at 490, 522 A.2d at 9.
Id.
Id. at 493, 522 A.2d at 9.
Id. at 494, 522 A.2d at 10.
Id.
Id.
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untary settlement which would not give rise to that right. 2
Justice Zappala, the sole dissenter, was of the opinion that the
legislative intent in enacting the UCATA and the Comparative
Negligence Act was two-fold. First of all, section 8326 of the
UCATA provided for a reduction in the claim against a non-settling tortfeasor "in the amount of the consideration paid" by the
settling tortfeasor, "or in any amount or proportion by which the
release provides ... if greater than the consideration paid".53 According to Justice Zappala, the legislature, by clear and unambiguous language, intended the claim against the non-settling
tortfeasor to be reduced by the greater of the consideration paid or
the proportionate share of liability as determined by a jury."
Thus, in the case at bar, the consideration paid by the settling
tortfeasor was the larger amount and should have been the figure
used in reducing the claim against the non-settling tortfeasor.5
Secondly, Justice Zappala was of the opinion that the legislature
intended to provide a right of contribution among tortfeasors when
a settling tortfeasor paid more than his percentage share of the
verdict. 56 Justice Zappala interpreted section 8324 of the UCATA,
which provides for the right of contribution among joint
tortfeasors, and section 7102(b) of the Comparative Negligence
Act, which provides that a "defendant who is compelled to pay
more than his percentage share may seek contribution",57 as being
applicable to cases where a settling tortfeasor pays more than his
proportionate share of the verdict.5 8 Justice Zappala reasoned that
"the judiciary's function is to apply the law as it is stated, not to
restate it to conform with its own beliefs"." Justice Zappala would
therefore have affirmed the lower court opinions and held Daugherty and Mong to be the correct interpretation of the law. 0
In 1976, the Pennsylvania General Assembly adopted the doc52.

Id. at 496, 522 A.2d at 11.

53. Id. at 499, 522 A.2d at 12. See 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 8326 (Purdon 1978).

54. 513 Pa. at 499, 522 A.2d at 12. Justice Zappala interpreted the majority's holding
as striking out the provision of section 8326 which refers to the consideration paid, thereby
utilizing only the proportionate share provision when reducing a claim. Id.
55. Id. The consideration paid by the settling tortfeasor (Giant Eagle) was $22,500.00,
a larger amount than its actual proportionate share, as determined by the jury, of
$18,600.00. Id.
56. Id. at 505, 522 A.2d at 15.
57. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon 1978).
58. 513 Pa. at 505, 522 A.2d at 15.
59. Id. at 499, 522 A.2d at 12.
60. Id. at 508, 522 A.2d at 17.
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trine of comparative negligence." In adopting this doctrine, contributory negligence was eliminated as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery 62 as long as the plaintiff's negligence is no greater
than fifty percent.6 3 The adoption of a comparative negligence
statute was the legislative response to the harsh and inequitable
common law doctrine of contributory negligence. 4 Prior to the
61. Act of July, 9, 1976, 1976 Pa. Laws 855 (codified in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102
(Purdon 1978)). Senate Bill 1237 was approved by Governor Milton J. Shapp on July 9,
1976, to be effective 60 days later on September 7, 1976. Final passage in the Senate by a
48-1 vote occurred on June 15, 1976. Final passage in the House by a vote of 173-19 occurred on June 30, 1976. See History of Senate Bills Sessions of 1975 and 1976 A-162.
62. The original act read as follows:
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts as
follows:
Section 1. Comparative Negligence - In all actions brought to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the
plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the
causal negligence of the defendants or defendant against whom recovery is sought,
but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
Section 2. Recovery against Joint Defendant; Contribution - Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of
his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants
against whom recovery is allowed.
The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant
against whom such plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so
compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution.
Section 3. Effective Date - This act shall take effect in 60 days.
Act of July, 9, 1976, 1976 Pa. Laws 855 (codified in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon
1978)).
63. Pennsylvania adopted a modified system of comparative negligence as opposed to
a pure form. Under the modified system, two variations are permissible. In one case, a plaintiff may recover so long as his negligence is not greater than the negligence of the defendant
or defendants. Thus, a plaintiff can recover as long as his contributory negligence is 50% or
less (as is the case in Pennsylvania). Under a second variation, a plaintiff can recover as long
as his negligence is not equal to or greater than the negligence of the defendant or defendants. In this case, a plaintiff whose negligence constitutes 50% or more would be barred
from recovering.
Under a pure system of comparative negligence, a plaintiff can recover damages regardless
of his degree of fault. Thus, a plaintiff 90% negligent can still recover 10% damages from a
defendant or defendants. See Sherman, An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute, 38 U. Prr. L. REV. 51 (1977).
64. The common law doctrine of contributory negligence is said to have its origins in
the 1809 case of Butterfield v. Forrestor, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 11 East 60 (1809), wherein it
was held that:
[a] party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault
of another, and avail himself of it, if he does not himself use common and ordinary
caution to be in the right. . .One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself. Two things must occur to support this action,
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concept of comparative negligence, a plaintiff who was contributorily negligent was barred by such negligence, no matter how
slight, from recovery against a negligent defendant or defendants. 5
Judicial exceptions 6 to the rule that a plaintiff's contributory
negligence operated as an absolute bar to recovery sought to mitigate the harshness of the doctrine. These exceptions permitted a
jury to judicially apportion damages through a 'compromise verdict'. 67 Since the law was incapable of apportioning damages between a negligent plaintiff and a negligent defendant, it was
equally assumed that the law was also unwilling and/or unable to
apportion damages among negligent defendants. Thus, the concept
of joint and several liability was devised, whereby each tortfeasor
was made fully responsible for the total injury sustained.68 If an
injured plaintiff recovered full satisfaction against one defendant,
such satisfaction operated to release the remaining defendants. 9 A
tortfeasor who was required to pay the total judgment had no common law right to seek contribution from the remaining tortfeasors.
Under the common law, courts were reluctant to assist one guilty
party in recovering contribution from another guilty party. Also,
since the law was incapable of apportioning damages, it was difficult, if not impossible, to determine the proper amount of
an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care
to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.
Id. at 927, 11 East at 61.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 39. See also Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa. 192 (1863); Elliot v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 356 Pa. 643, 53 A.2d 81 (1947); Ennis v. Atkins, 354 Pa. 165, 47 A.2d 217
(1946); Pittsburgh A. & M., Pass. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 74 Pa. 421 (1843); Johnson v. West
Chester P.R. Co., 70 Pa. 357 (1872); Creed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 Pa. 139 (1878).
67. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955). Chief Justice Bell, speaking
for the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, stated that:
The doctrine of comparative negligence, or degrees of negligence, is not recognized by
the Courts of Pennsylvania, but as a practical matter they are frequently taken into
consideration by a jury. The net result, as every trial judge knows, is that in a large
majority of negligence cases where the evidence of negligence is not clear, or where
the question of contributory negligence is not free from doubt, the jury brings in a
compromise verdict. ...
Where the evidence of negligence or contributory negligence, or both, is conflicting or
not free from doubt, a trial judge has the power to uphold the time-honored right of a
jury to render a compromise verdict . ..
Id. at 154.
68. Charles, 513 Pa. at 487, 522 A.2d at 7. See also Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp.
Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954).
69. 513 Pa. at 487, 522 A.2d at 7. This was the common law doctrine that a release of
one tortfeasor (either by settlement or judgment) released all tortfeasors. Id.
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contribution. 0
Judicial exceptions to the harsh rule of no contribution among
joint tortfeasors originally found relief in equity rather than under
any theory of tort law. The emerging sentiment in Pennsylvania
was that since all tortfeasors shared equally in responsibility for
the plaintiff's damages, equity demanded that all tortfeasors also
share equally in the 'common burden' of compensating for such
damages. Equity was the proper relief because the law's incapacity
to apportion damages deprived the defendant seeking contribution
of an adequate remedy at law. 1
Judicial exceptions permitting contribution resulted in a modification of the common law concept of joint and several liability.
Not only was contribution permitted among tortfeasors, but a release of one tortfeasor no longer operated to release all
tortfeasors.7 2 Thus, an injured plaintiff who settled with and released one tortfeasor was now permitted to recover the remainder
of the damages from the additional non-settling tortfeasor(s).7 3
The aforementioned exceptions to contribution were eventually
codified and enacted as The Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act of July 9, 1951 (UCATA) 7 It is the interpretation
70. Id. See Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928).
71. 513 Pa. at 487, 522 A.2d at 7. See also, Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa.
354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
72. 513 Pa. at 488, 522 A.2d at 7.
73. Id.
74. Act of July 9, 1951, ch.248, 1951 Pa. Laws 1130-31 (codified in 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8321-8327 (Purdon 1978)). The original text of the act read as follows:
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts as
follows:
Section 1. For the purpose of this act, the term "joint tortfeasors" means two or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property,
whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.
Section 2. (1) The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors; (2) A joint
tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share
thereof; (3) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is
not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to
the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.
Section 3. The recovery of a judgment by the injured person against one joint
tortfeasor does not discharge the other joint tortfeasors.
Section 4. A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or
after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release
provides that the total claim shall be reduced if greater than the consideration paid.
Section 5. A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor does not relieve him
from liability to make contribution to another tortfeasor, unless the release is given
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of this Act, both before and after the adoption of a Comparative
Negligence Act in Pennsylvania, that was the central focus in
Charles v. Giant Eagle, as well as in the case law which preceded
Charles.
The doctrine of contributory negligence had its roots in the misguided belief that the law had no means of distributing liability
between plaintiffs and defendants, or among defendants.7 5 Thus,
the equitable solution in the pre-comparative negligence era was to
allocate liability equally according to the number of tortfeasors. 7 6
It is this pre-comparative negligence method of equally allocating
fault, when viewed in the context of the UCATA of 1951, that was
the main topic of debate in Daugherty v. Hershberger7 and Mong
before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution
has accrued and provides for a reduction to the extent of the pro rata share of the
released tortfeasor of the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other
tortfeasors.
Section 6. This act does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Section 7. This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.
Section 8. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act".
Section 9. The act, approved the twenty-fourth day of June, one thousand nine hundred thirty nine (Pamphlet Laws 1075), entitled "An act to provide for contribution
among tortfeasors" is hereby repealed. All other acts and parts of acts are hereby
repealed in so far as inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
Section 10. The provisions of this act shall become effective immediately upon its
final enactment.
Id.
75. Charles, 513 Pa. at 487, 522 A.2d at 9.
76. Id. at 488, 522 A.2d at 10. For example, if two tortfeasors injured a plaintiff, each
would be responsible for 50% of the damages, regardless of their individual degree of negligence or fault. Id.
77. 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), overruled, 513 Pa. 478, 522 A.2d 1 (1987). In
Daugherty, plaintiff Daugherty and his family were involved in a three car collision with
defendants Mong and Hershberger. Prior to the trial, Mong settled with Daugherty for
$13,500.00 to be distributed among the injured plaintiffs according to their individual loss.
Daugherty executed a release which discharged Mong from liability and provided that damages recoverable against other tortfeasors (Hershberger) would be reduced to the extent of
Mong's pro rata share (50%). Daugherty then sued Hershberger, who joined Mong as an
additional defendant. The total jury verdict for the individual injuries was $11,720.99
($5,860.45 each). When Daugherty attempted to collect 50% of the verdict from Hershberger, Hershberger motioned for a reduction of the verdicts against him, in light of Mong's
settlement overpayment, and a discharge and satisfaction of the verdicts. On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hershberger, holding that where one joint
tortfeasor settles with a plaintiff and obtains a release which provides that the damages
recoverable against the other joint tortfeasor were to be reduced by the pro rata share of the
settling tortfeasor, the plaintiff can only recover from the non-settling tortfeasor the difference between the total verdict and the amount of the settlement which exceeds the settling
tortfeasor's pro rate share. In short, Hershberger, by benefit of Mong's settlement, was re-
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v. Hershberger.78 Daugherty and Mong were two pre-comparative
negligence cases discussed extensively in Justice Papadakos' concurrence and, to a lesser extent, in Chief Justice Nix's majority
opinion in Charles v. Giant Eagle.
Daugherty dealt with the proper interpretation of section 4 of
the UCATA of 1951. 7 ' The issue before the Daugherty court was
whether section 4 provides for a reduction of a non-settling
tortfeasor's liability only to the extent of one-half of the verdict
against him, as provided in the release given to the settling
tortfeasor. Alternatively, the court had to determine whether section 4 provides for a reduction of each verdict in the amount of the
consideration paid by the settling tortfeasor when such consideration is greater than a one-half reduction of the verdict.8 0
Justice Papadakos' concurrence reasoned that Daugherty could
be viewed as the proper application of the law of contribution because the law was incapable of apportioning damages. Therefore,
any settlement by one tortfeasor was interpreted as discharging
part of the total liability of all tortfeasors. 81 In fact, on its face, the
Daugherty holding does appear to be a proper interpretation of
section 4 of the UCATA. 82 The Daugherty court interpreted section 4 as encompassing the following two prong test when dealing
with releases: (1) if the consideration paid for the release is greater
than the proportional reduction contained in the release, the consideration figure should be applied to reduce the claim against the
other tortfeasors; and (2) if the proportional reduction figure contained in the release is greater than the consideration paid for the
release, the proportional reduction figure should be applied to required to pay Daugherty only $1,839.26 instead of the $5,860.45 (50%) jury verdict against
him. Id.
78. 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962). Mong, the companion case to Daugherty,
involved an appeal by Mong from the entry of a judgment in favor of Hershberger in an
action of assumpsit by Mong against Hershberger for contribution. The amount involved
was the difference between Hershberger's 50% pro rats share of the verdict ($5,860.45) and
what Hershberger actually paid ($1,839.26). The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in holding
for Mong, interpreted section 2 of the UCATA of 1951 as allowing a right of contribution to
a settling tortfeasor. Id. at 429.
79. See supra note 74 for the terms of section 4.
80. Daugherty, 386 Pa. at 372-73, 126 A.2d at 733.
81. Charles, 513 Pa. at 488, 522 A.2d at 8. Justice Papadakos viewed Daugherty and
Mong as the most equitable solutions to the law of contribution among tortfeasors available
at the time. Daugherty barred the plaintiff from obtaining a double recovery while Mong, by
allowing the settling tortfeasor contribution from the non-settling tortfeasor, barred the
non-settling tortfeasor from obtaining the benefit of a high settlement. Id. at 489, 522 A.2d
at 9.
82. Daugherty, 386 Pa. at 375, 126 A.2d at 734.

1988

Recent Decision

duce the claim against the other tortfeasors8 a
Under the above analysis, the Daugherty court construed section
4 of the UCATA as requiring a reduction in the plaintiff's claim
against all tortfeasors by the amount of the settlement figure paid
by the settling tortfeasor. The court reached this conclusion because the settlement figure was larger than the proportional reduction figure contained in the release.8 4 The Daugherty court attempted, in part, to justify its reasoning by stating that its
interpretation of section 4 of the UCATA was an abandonment of
the common law concept that a release of one tortfeasor worked a
release of all tortfeasors. Thus, under this interpretation of the
UCATA, an injured plaintiff would now be able to settle with one
tortfeasor and still have recourse against the remaining tortfeasors
for additional compensation.85
No one would argue with Justice Papadakos and the Daugherty
court's contentions that Daugherty embodied the then existing law
of contribution among tortfeasors. Nor could there be argument
that Daugherty was the most equitable solution available in light
of the previous common law doctrines. Yet, there are inherent inequities in the majority opinion of Daugherty that were attacked
in Justice Musmanno's dissent in Daugherty.6
Justice Musmanno questioned why Hershberger received a
'sheer gratuity' of $4,021.18 by only paying $1,839.26 of a $5,860.44
jury verdict against him, when he denied liability, refused to settle,
forced a trial, and was adjudged liable by a jury of his peers for
one-half of the verdict.8 7 According to the terms of the release,
83. Id. at 373, 126 A.2d at 733. The Daugherty court, in interpreting section 4 of the
UCATA, held that:
[I]f the proportion of reduction provided by the release is greater than the amount of
the consideration paid for the release, such proportion of reduction prevails, but if, on
the other hand, the consideration paid for the release is greater than the proportion
of reduction provided by the release, then the amount of the consideration paid for
the release prevails.
Id.
84. Id. at 375-76, 126 A.2d at 734. The settlement figure of $13,500.00 was larger than
the proportional reduction figure contained in the release, which was a one-half reduction of
the jury verdict, or $5,860.45. Id.
85. Id. at 374, 126 A.2d at 733-34.
86. Id. at 375-82, 126 A.2d at 734-37. Justice Musmanno's dissent in Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955), vigorously argued against the use of degrees of negligence by a jury or judge in rendering a compromise verdict, where the weight of evidence
indicated that the defendant was negligent and the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, because a doctrine of comparative negligence had not as yet been adopted in Pennsylvania. Id. at 238-47, 126 A.2d at 156-60.
87. 386 Pa. at 376, 126 A.2d at 734-35. According to Justice Musmanno, defendant
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Hershberger was only responsible for fifty percent of the verdict,
yet he still attempted to escape his share of liability. 5 Justice
Musmanno reasoned that since the release protected Hershberger
from paying more than his percentage share of liability (fifty percent), it would be absurd to suggest that the same release would
allow Hershberger to escape his fifty percent share of liability."
Since Hershberger, under the terms of the release, would not suffer
the detriment of a bad bargain if Mong had settled for less than
the jury verdict, he should not have been allowed the benefit of a
bargain in which he took no part. 90
According to Justice Musmanno, the purpose of the UCATA is
to promote the settlement of lawsuits." The majority view in
Daugherty acts to discourage settlements because each tortfeasor
will forego settlement hoping that the other tortfeasor will settle
for an amount in excess of his percentage of the jury verdict. Thus,
under the Daugherty rule, the non-settling tortfeasor could benefit
by the ensuing windfall. 9 2 Finally, Justice Musmanno finds it ironic
that, while the trial court approved the settlement and release entered into between Mong and Daugherty, 3 the majority's interpretation of section 4 of the UCATA completely disregarded the
terms of the release.
Hershberger wanted a benefit for which he neither bargained nor negotiated for: "He
[Hershberger] wants to travel on a train for which he purchased no ticket, he seeks to
mount a horse which he did not feed, he desires to ride on a merry-go round which, so far as
he was concerned, might never have been built." Id. at 377, 126 A.2d at 735.
88. Id. at 378, 126 A.2d at 735-36.
89. Id. Justice Musmanno quotes from the Statutory Construction Act of May 28,
1937, 46 P.S. § 552, which specifically states: "[Tihe Legislature does not intend a result
that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable". Id.
90. Daugherty, 386 Pa. at 378-79, 126 A.2d at 735-36.
91. Id. at 377, 126 A.2d at 735. Justice Musmanno stated that: "Section 4 is not
couched in as clear and unambiguous language as the majority wants to believe, but there
can be no doubt as to the purpose of the Act. Its purpose is to urge the settlement of lawsuits ..
" Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
Pursuant to said Court order, the Daugherty's executed pro rats releases in favor of
John Mong in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. . . . Said pro rata releases released only John Mong
but reduced the damages recoverable by the Daugherty's against all other tortfeasors
by the pro rata share of John Mong, which amounted to a fifty (50%) per cent reduction of such damages.
Id.
94. Id. The terms of the release provided for a 50% reduction in the damages, while
under the court's interpretation of section 4 of the UCATA, the damages would be reduced
by the amount of the consideration paid, if that amount was greater than the proportional
reduction figure. Id.
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Chief Justice Nix's majority opinion in Charles echoed Justice
Musmanno's reasoning in Daugherty.95 The Chief Justice stressed
the necessity of "the finality of the settlement agreement,"6 and
warned against the harm of disturbing such a meeting of the minds
between the plaintiff and his tortfeasor. 97 He reasoned that adhering to the Daugherty rule of providing a windfall to the non-settling tortfeasor would seriously erode the public policy of encouraging settlements.9 8
Perhaps in part to ameliorate the inequities of the Daugherty
decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Mong granted Mong
a right of contribution against Hershberger. 99 The Mong court read
section 2 of the UCATA as allowing contribution if a settling
tortfeasor secures a complete release of all tortfeasors by extinguishing the other tortfeasor's liability through the settlement. 10 0
The court then acknowledged that, although the Mong settlement
and release did not operate to completely extinguish the total
claim against all tortfeasors,' 0° it would be inequitable to allow one
tortfeasor to benefit at the expense of another. Similarly, it would
be inequitable to allow a plaintiff double recovery.1 02 The court refused to give a strict interpretation to the third provision of section
2, stating that such a meaning was not the intent of the legislature."0 3 Instead, the Mong court interpreted the word 'extinguish'
in the third provision of section 2 as encompassing a partial, as
well as a total, extinguishment.0 4
95. Charles, 513 Pa. at 478, 522 A.2d at 2-3.
96. Id. at 477, 522 A.2d at 2.
97. Id. at 478, 522 A.2d at 3.
98. Id. "Appellees' concern over a windfall to the plaintiff, if appellee were to be
required to pay its full pro rata share, is far overshadowed by the injustice of the result they

urge." Id.
99. Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962). See supra note 78.
100. 200 Pa. Super. at 70, 186 A.2d at 428. See supra note 74 for the text of the third
provision of section 2.
101. 200 Pa. Super. at 71, 186 A.2d at 428. The release was a partial extinguishment of
Hershberger's liability, operating to extinguish $4,021.23 of the $5,860.50 judgement against
Hershberger. Id.
102. Id. at 71, 186 A.2d at 429. See also Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d
289 (1961).
103. 200 Pa. Super. at 72, 186 A.2d at 429. The court relied on The Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, art. IV, § 51 et seq., 46 P.S. § 551 et seq., which
requires that in ascertaining legislative intent of a statute, it is presumed that the legislature
did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. The Mong court was of the opinion that
depriving a settling tortfeasor of a right to contribution would be unreasonable and absurd.
200 Pa. Super. at 72, 186 A.2d at 429.
104. Id. The court suggests that the verb extinguish has various meanings to include
gradual or limited results, as well as a complete elimination of something. Id.
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Like Daugherty, Mong could be judged, on its face, as the most
equitable solution available at the time.'0 5 Yet, Mong also contains
inherent inequities. While the Daugherty court stripped the plaintiff of the benefit of a good bargain,'" the Mong court rewarded
the tortfeasor who made a bad bargain by allowing him to recoup
his overpayment through contribution. 10 7 Mong circumvents a settlement and release freely bargained for, and in its place exchanges
the settlement figure with the verdict figure.10 8

The Mong court's rationale suggests that two wrongs make a
right. As Chief Justice Nix stated in the case at bar, Daugherty
was wrongly decided and Mong was an attempt to correct that
wrong with another wrong. 109 The Mong court, like the Daugherty
court, was so obsessed with preventing the plaintiff from obtaining
a double recovery" that it began to manipulate the words of the
UCATA to fit its own interpretation.'
The Comparative Negligence Act can be viewed, in part, as the
legislative response to the inequities of the Daugherty and Mong
decisions. 1 12 Although Chief Justice Nix claims that Charles v. Giant Eagle is a case of first impression,"' the issue as to whether
the Comparative Negligence Act modifies the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was first addressed in this jurisdiction
in Mummery v. Farley."4 In fact, the Charles holding is a mirror
105. Charles, 513 Pa. at 491, 522 A.2d at 8.
106. Id. at 491, 522 A.2d at 9. Had the Daugherty court required Hershberger to pay
his full 50% of the verdict ($5,860.45), the plaintiff, by benefit of settlement, would have
received a windfall of $4,021.23. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. According to Justice Papadakos, the Mong court's interpretation of the third
provision of section 2 of the UCATA was an invalidation of that portion of the UCATA
which prohibits a settling tortfeasor from seeking contribution unless a non-settling
tortfeasor's total liability is extinguished by the settlement. Justice Papadakos interprets
'extinguish' in the Act as requiring a complete and total extinguishment. Id.
109. 513 Pa. at 482, 522 A.2d at 4.
110. Mong, 200 Pa. Super. at 71, 186 A.2d at 428-29. It could also be argued that the
Daugherty and Mong results prevent the plaintiff from receiving a recovery at all. See, e.g.,
supra note 101.
111. 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962). The Mong court relied on The Statutory
Construction Act, supra note 105, in ascertaining legislative intent, yet that section of the
Act only applies when the words of a law are not explicit: "When the words of a law are
clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext
of pursuing its spirit." Id.
112. Charles, 513 Pa. at 492, 522 A.2d at 9. The legislative history of both the UCATA
and the CNA is sparse. Id.
113. Id. at 476, 522 A.2d at 2.
114. Mummery v. Farley, 32 D.& C.3d 307 (1984). Mummery was struck and killed,
while walking to a school bus stop, by a vehicle operated by Farley and owned by North
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image of the Mummery decision.11
The Mummery court believed that the Daugherty and Mong decisions were compelled by the language of the UCATA, even
though the result would not only discourage settlements, but
would also strip the plaintiff of the benefits of a contract freely
entered into with the settling defendant. " 6 According to the Mummery court, Daugherty was an improvement over the pre-UCATA
common law results where a release of one tortfeasor released all
tortfeasors. However, the court concluded that this improvement
did not foster settlements. 11 7 The Mummery court believed that a
policy of allowing the plaintiff to retain the benefit of a high settlement gives the plaintiff incentive to settle. It also encourages additional defendants to settle rather than face a trial and a possibly
larger determination of liability.1 8 For example, Mummery argues
that at trial the non-settling tortfeasor will be the target of the
plaintiff's attack because the settling tortfeasor, by terms of the
release, is out of the picture. Since the non-settling tortfeasor is
the sole defendant, the verdict could result in the non-settling defendant's liability being greater than it actually is. The court suggests that had Farley gone to trial, his negligence would more than
American Clothing Card Co. The plaintiff, Mummery's father and administrator of the estate, brought an action in trespass against both Farley for operating the vehicle, and the
school district for negligently placing the school bus stop. Before trial, Farley settled with
the plaintiff for $90,000 in exchange for a release. At the trial against the school district, the
jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of $151,819, apportioning Farley 35% negligent
and the school district 65% negligent. Farley filed a motion to mold the verdict and crossclaimed for payback of his $43,863.85 overpayment. The school district paid its full pro rata
share of $112,635.50. Farley's cross-claim was denied and the plaintiff was awarded the excess. An appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was discontinued on July 23, 1984. Id.
115. Id. at 307. The Mummery court held:
1. The Comparative Negligence Act of 1978 has modified The Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act so as to require a non-settling joint tortfeasor to pay the full
amount of a verdict entered against him even if that verdict when added to the settlement amount paid before trial to plaintiff by the other joint tortfeasor exceeds the
sum of the verdicts against both.
2. A joint tortfeasor who settles for a sum exceeding the verdict later entered against
him has no right of contribution against the non-settling defendant for any excess
over the verdict against him, nor does he have any right against plaintiff for such
excess.
Id.
116. Id. at 311.
117. Id. at 312. The court suggests that "It is reasonable to suspect that numerous
plaintiffs have refused settlements in the 28 years since Daugherty came down." Id.
118. Id. at 312. The Mummery court reasoned that the UCATA was originally intended to encourage settlements: "The policy of the Act is to encourage rather than discourage settlements." Id. See Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 1(d), Commissioners Comment (1955 Revision), 12 U.L.A. 65 (Master Ed. 1975).
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likely have been determined at a higher percentage
than it actually
119
was, as he was the-actively negligent party.
The Mummery court reasoned that the CNA, unlike the
UCATA, contains absolutely no limitations on the total recovery
determined by the jury. 2 0 The CNA permits a right of contribution only in cases where the defendant is compelled to pay more
than his pro rata share of liability. According to the court, Farley
was not compelled to pay the settlement figure or any amount over
and above that for which he was adjudged liable. He freely bought
his peace and his way out of a lawsuit, and should be compelled to
21
abide by the terms of the contract he negotiated.
Finally, the Mummery court stated that both parties assume
risks by settlement; the plaintiff risks accepting a figure that might
be lower than what a jury would award, and the defendant risks
paying out more than that for which he might subsequently be
held liable. 22 The purpose behind a settlement is that if both parties bargain in good faith, the settlement figure will closely approximate a potential jury verdict. At the same time, the settlement
will by-pass a potentially costly and lengthy trial. 2 3
The strength of the Mummery decision lies in the logic of its
interpretation of the relationship between the pertinent statutes.
Chief Justice Nix, on the other hand, in speaking for the majority
in Charles, relies to a certain extent on what other courts have said
on the matter. 2 4 In arguing that the settlement figure should prevail over the jury verdict, Chief Justice Nix states that the jury
verdict is not a cap on recovery because the settlement should be
the final resolution between the parties. Reasoning that the jury
verdict is not necessarily an accurate assessment of a tortfeasor's
obligation, in light of a settlement agreement, Chief Justice Nix
25
relies on a similar holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
119. 32 D.& C.3d at 314.
120. Id. at 315. The Mummery court interprets section 4 of the UCATA as setting a
ceiling on total recovery to the amount of the jury verdict. Id.
121. Id. at 316.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 313.
124. Charles, 513 Pa. at 478-79, 522 A.2d at 3. As was noted earlier, Chief Justice Nix
appears to side with Justice Musmanno's dissent in Daugherty. Id.
125. Id. In Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 239-40, 208 A.2d 135 (1965), the New
Jersey Supreme Court held:
There is no precise measure of the amount of the wrong. Even if the trial is as to
damages only, successive juries would rarely make the identical appraisal. Nor is
there reason to suppose that the jury's evaluation of losses is more accurate than the
evaluation made by the parties to the settlement. Surely where liability is contested,
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Chief Justice Nix's majority opinion also points out that in the
case of the non-settling tortfeasor, the jury verdict is determinative
of that tortfeasor's liability. He argues that the jury verdict should
not be disturbed, even if it results in a windfall for the plaintiff
when added to the settlement figure.'2 6 In reaching this conclusion,
the Chief Justice relies on a Supreme Court of Texas opinion for
justification of such a windfall."'
As an advocate of the public policy favoring settlements, Chief
Justice Nix believes that such a public policy would be advanced
by holding a non-settling tortfeasor responsible for his full pro rata
share of the damages. 28 This is the same position adopted by the
29
Colorado Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Nix's over-reliance on the decisions of other jurisdictions is due in part to his belief that Charles is a case of first
impression. 3 0 Although the Chief Justice makes a stronger argument through his interpretation of the statutes,' 1 he gives us little
the verdict may not reflect the exact worth of the injuries. When the cost of litigation
is taken into account, it becomes still more difficult to say that enforcement of the
judgment debtor's pro rata share liability would enrich the plaintiff.
Id.
126. Charles, 513 Pa. at 497, 522 A.2d at 3. According to Chief Justice Nix, the settlement amount should in no way affect the liability of the remaining defendants as determined by the jury. Id.
127. Id. The Supreme Court of Texas, in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 665
S.W.2d 414, 430 (Tex. 1984), stated that: "A percent credit necessarily means that settling
plaintiffs may recover more than the amount of damages ultimately determined, but they
also may recover less. Plaintiffs bear the risk of poor settlements; logic and equity dictate
that the benefit of good settlements should also be theirs." Id.
128. 513 Pa. at 479, 522 A.2d at 3.
129. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court, in Kussman v. City and County of Denver, 706
P.2d 776, 782 (Colo. 1985), claimed that:
Not deducting the settlement amount from the judgement against the [non-settling
tortfeasor] promotes the [Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors] Act's goal of encouraging settlements. If the plaintiff knew that any settlement reached would be
deducted from the proportionate share owed to the plaintiff by another tortfeasor,
the plaintiff would be less likely to settle. Similarly, tortfeasors might refuse to settle,
hoping that their just share of damages would be reduced by the settlement amount
paid by another tortfeasor.
Id.
130. 513 Pa. at 476, 522 A.2d at 2. It is surprising that the Charles court was not
aware of the Mummery decision. Perhaps Chief Justice Nix meant that the issue was one of
first impression at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court level.
131. Id. at 480, 522 A.2d at 3-4. Chief Justice Nix's interpretation of section 7102 of
the CNA is consistent with Mummery in holding a tortfeasor liable for his full pro rats
share of damages as well as denying a tortfeasor who settles the right to seek contribution.
See supra note 62, section 2. Chief Justice Nix suggests a unique approach to interpreting
section 8326 of the UCATA, see supra note 74, section 4, in claiming that it provides an
option for the parties executing the release to determine whether the total claim should be
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background or history to enable the reader to fully understand
why he takes this stance. Chief Justice Nix fails to go into the history or evolution of the statutes, and says little to distinguish
Mong and Daugherty, other than to overrule Daugherty and to reject Mong.1 3 2 We are left with the impression that Chief Justice
Nix's interpretation is his personal belief of what the law should be
rather than what the law is.
Justice Papadakos, on the other hand, provides an historical
foundation of the law in his concurrence.'"3 Justice Papadakos' historical analysis of the law suggests that the current statutes are the
result of an historical evolution with its roots in the common law.
According to Justice Papadakos, the harsh common law doctrines
of joint and several liability, contributory negligence, and no right
of contribution gave way to judicial exceptions which were eventually codified as the UCATA.3'a The UCATA gave rise to the
Daugherty and Mong decisions, which in light of the law's inability
to apportion damages, were viewed as the proper application of the
then existing law, as well as the most equitable solutions available.
The CNA was the legislative reaction to the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence and the misguided belief that the law was incapable of apportioning damages. Charles, then, was the first
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case to reveal the interaction between the CNA and the UCATA, and how the CNA has modified
the UCATA.3 6
Prior to the CNA each tortfeasor was held jointly and severally
liable for an equal pro tanto share of the judgment in proportion to
the number of tortfeasors.8 6 The CNA fixed each tortfeasor's liability by law according to a factual determination of the causal
negligence attributable to all the tortfeasors. Therefore, the operation of settlements only discharges the settling tortfeasor's percentage share of causal negligence.13 7 Any right of contribution
under the CNA exists only where a defendant is compelled to pay
more than his pro rata share. Consequently, Justice Papadakos was
of the opinion that the legislature, in enacting the CNA, did not
reduced by the consideration paid or by a separate amount or proportion agreed upon, provided that the total claim is greater than the consideration paid. Chief Justice Nix is silent
on what would happen if the consideration was greater than the total claim.
132. 513 Pa. at 480, 522 A.2d at 3-4.
133. Id. at 485-86, 522 A.2d at 5.
134. Id. at 486-91, 522 A.2d at 6-9.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 491, 522 A.2d at 10.
137. Id.
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intend to provide for a right of contribution in the case of
settlements.13 8
The sole dissenter of Charles, Justice Zappala, reasoned that the
majority's interpretation of the UCATA renders it meaningless by
denying an explicit legislative right of contribution among
tortfeasors. 1s9 Justice Zappala adheres to the Daugherty holding
that section 8326 of the UCATA" ' ° is phrased in the alternative to
provide for a reduction in the claim against the non-settling
tortfeasor by the larger amount of the consideration paid or the
proportionate share of liability."" He also criticizes the majority's
contention that the Daugherty opinion discourages settlements, arguing that settlements have not been crippled by the Daugherty
decision in the thirty years since it first came down."4 2 Unfortunately, Justice Zappala fails to back-up this argument with any
empirical data.
Justice Zappala continued his attack on the majority opinion,
and in particular, on Chief Justice Nix's reliance on state opinions
which have not adopted the statutory language of section 4 of the
1939 UCATA as recommended by the National Commission. The
1939 UCATA was the precursor to the 1951 UCATA, and Pennsylvania was one of the jurisdictions that adopted the text of the 1939
Act verbatim. According to Justice Zappala, neither Texas nor
New Jersey adopted the Act as recommended by the
14 3
commission.
Justice Zappala also noted that of the three jurisdictions relied
upon in Chief Justice Nix's opinion, only Colorado has adopted a
UCATA comparable to Pennsylvania's. 4 4 Justice Zappala distin138. Id.
139. Id. at 496, 522 A.2d at 11.
140. Id. Section 8326 as codified is a re-enactment of section 4 of the UCATA of 1951.
See supra note 74.
141. 513 Pa. at 498-99, 522 A.2d at 12. Justice Zappala attempts to ascertain legislative intent by the language of the statute and relies on the Statutory Construction Act. Id.
142. 513 Pa. at 499, 522 A.2d at 11.
143. Id. at 500, 522 A.2d at 13.
144. Id. at 502, 522 A.2d at 13-14. The Colorado Statute, 6 C.R.S. § 13-50.5-105,
states:
(1) When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgement is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same
wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others
to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution
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guished the Colorado case relied upon by the Chief Justice14 5 from
two later Colorado cases which appear to follow the Daugherty line
of reasoning. 4 6 Although the Colorado legislature subsequently
amended the statute to provide for a pro rata reduction of the nonsettling tortfeasor's claim,
Justice Zappala distinguished between a legislative amendment and a court "which usurps the legislature's authority and redrafts the Pennsylvania statute".4 8
Lastly, Justice Zappala believed that the only effect the CNA
has on the UCATA is to alter the method for calculating the
amount of contribution a tortfeasor may recover. 4 9 Thus, contribution would be based upon the pro rata share of liability of the
tortfeasors. 50
The UCATA and the CNA were legislative responses to the
harsh and inequitable common law tort doctrines.' 51 Yet, it is only
through Justice Papadakos' concurrence that one comprehends the
historical evolution of the common law, case law and statutory law
that preceded Charles. Justice Papadakos combines the logic of
Mummery with an historical analysis of the evolving law which
culminated in the Charles decision. Each step in the law, although
the most equitable solution available at the time, contained inherent inequities and prompted either legislative or judicial response.
It is to early to predict whether Charles, as another step in this
historical evolution, will require further judicial or legislative
refinement. 152
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to any other tortfeasor.
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145. 513 Pa. at 503, 522 A.2d at 13. See supra note 130.
146. Id. See Perimuter v. Blessing, 706 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1985), and Greenemeier v.
Spencer, 719 P.2d 710 (Colo. 1986).
147. 513 Pa. at 500, n.2, 522 A.2d at 13, n.2. See 6 C.R.S. § 13-50.5-105(1)(a).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 505, 522 A.2d at 15.
150. Id. This is known as the doctrine of comparative contribution. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 885 (1977). See also Griffith, Contribution, Indemnity, Settlements,
and Releases: What The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Statute Did Not Say, 24
VILL. L. REV. 503 (1970).
151. See supra note 39.
152. Patterson v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 514 Pa. 585, 526 A.2d 357 (1987), on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was remanded back to the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia for further consideration in light of Charles v. Giant Eagle.

